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U.S. Const, amend. V 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in the State's brief contains the 
following inaccuracies: 
At page 3, the State incorrectly asserts that the 
robber's vehicle had its headlights "trained" on the victims. The 
pages it cites stand for nothing more than that the vehicle was 
facing in their general direction, and that its headlights were on. 
There is no evidence of where exactly the headlight beams were 
shining, and no evidence that they were "trained" on the victims. 
At page 5, the State asserts that Brandi Bergsma 
described the perpetrator identified at trial as Mr. Lopez as being 
5'1" to 5'5" tall. Her testimony was as follows: 
Q What did you put in terms of height? 
A I think five-one, because I'm five-one, so I 
was guessing short. And at the time I just hurried and 
jotted everything down. Five-five. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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R. 246-27. In context, Ms. Bergsma seems to be indicating that she 
compared the perpetrator's height to her own height of 5#1"# and 
estimated him to be 5'5" . See also Ex. 31 (attached to opening 
brief as addendum C) , which unambiguously references the 
perpetrator's height as 5'5". 
At page 7, the State asserts that Officer Johnson 
handcuffed three men, citing R. 246:83-4. While ostensibly 
supported by the record, this purported fact cannot be true. 
Richard Bergsma testified that not all the participants in the 
show-up were handcuffed, but Messrs. Gomez and Lopez were. R. 
230:187. Officer Johnson himself later testifies that only Gomez 
and Lopez were handcuffed. R. 101-2. See also Ex. 24 and 26 
(photographs of the show-up). While the State tries to suggest 
that perhaps these photographs were taken after the show up, 
State's brief at 5 n.5, implying that the others may have been 
uncuffed in the interim, this speculative assertion defies reason. 
The State fails to explain why it would continue to detain the 
i 
other individuals after they had been excluded as perpetrators. 
Such a suspicionless detention would, of course, be 
unconstitutional. 
At page 8, the State asserts that Mr. Lopez had a black 
t-shirt on over a white t-shirt at the time of the showup. There 
is no mention in the record of a black t^shirt, only of a black 
shirt. 
At page 8, the State asserts that "Officer Johnson 
observed that defendant and Gomez were both short and stocky, and 
i 
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were approximately 5'5" tall, and 150-160 pounds (R. 246:90)." To 
the contrary, while he did opine that both were short and stocky, 
R. 246:91, his retrospective recollection was that Mr. Gomez was 
5' 5", while Mr. Lopez was 5'5" or 5'6". Id. He ventured a 
retrospective guess that Mr. Lopez weighed 150-160 pounds. Id. 
At page 9, the State asserts that Mr. Lopez admitted 
being at the scene of the crime. This is a mischaracterization. 
Mr. Lopez never admitted to being at the scene, and certainly not 
at the time of the crime. Mr. Lopez only admitted to buying beer 
at the Circle K located near the crime scene. This is 
unremarkable. The State fails to explain why Mr. Lopez should have 
driven from the party to a more remote retail outlet, rather than 
using the most readily available one. Given that the apartments 
where Mr. Lopez was attending the party were less than two blocks 
from this Circle K, R. 246:82, --78, it is completely logical that 
Mr. Lopez would shop there rather than a more remote, less 
convenient retail outlet. 
At pages 10-11, the State asserts that Justin Ketterer 
testified that Mr. Lopez returned to the party at 11:45 p.m., when 
in fact he testified that he returned at "about 11:30, 11:45." R. 
246:167. 
At page 11, the State cites R. 247:16 for the proposition 
that Mr. Lopez is left handed. The cited statement is from the 
prosecutor's closing argument, and cannot constitute a testimonial 
fact. Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 354 P.2d 575, 578 
(Utah 1960) (statements of counsel are not evidence). 
3 
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At page 20, the State asserts that "the record is devoid 
of indication that the witnesses acted under any personal 
motivation bias or prejudice . . . " To the contrary, Rick Bergsma 
described the race of the perpetrator as "spick", and described 
unusual smells, mannerisms, speech, etc. as "spicks." Ex. 5. The 
State's purported justification of "cramped space on the form," 
State's br. at 20-21, is not born out by the form itself. Mr. 
Bergsma had plenty of room to write hispanic, as he did in Block #3 
on the front of the form. 
ARGUMENT 
{ 
POINT I. THE STATE MISAPPLIES RAMIREZ BY 
CONDUCTING ONLY A SUPERFICIAL FACT COMPARISON 
TO THE FACTS IN RAMIREZ, RATHER THAN A 
SEARCHING EXAMINATION OF THE RELIABILITY OF 
THE IDENTIFICATIONS UNDER THE LEGAL FACTORS 
SET FORTH IN THE OPINION. < 
Without supporting authority, the State proceeds on the 
untenable premise that analysis under Ramirez consists of nothing 
more than a comparison of the facts at bar with those in Ramirez. < 
The State focuses on those factors where the facts in Ramirez were 
more favorable to its position,1 but glosses over those factors 
which cut more strongly in favor of Mr. Lopez.2 i 
1E.cr. , greater opportunity to view the perpetrators, and lack 
of any mask. 
2E.cr. , that the descriptions do not match Mr. Lopez' physical ( 
characteristics or the clothing he was wearing; the failure of any 
of the eyewitnesses to notice facial hair on the perpetrator; the 
cross-contamination of the identifications as the result of all 
three being together and speaking with each other at the time of 
identification; the inconsistent testimony as to the role played by 
the perpetrator identified as Mr. Lopez from being a third i 
4 
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Ramirez does not set forth a checklist, requiring that 
each factor militate in favor of suppression. Rather, any single 
factor, if sufficiently egregious, may be sufficient to undermine 
reliability and require suppression. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d at 784 
(indicating that, under the facts of that case, the suggestiveness 
of the identification was most critical). 
POINT II. DISCREPANCIES IN THE DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN 
BY THE EYEWITNESSES ARE SIGNIFICANT AND 
STRONGLY SUPPORT A FINDING OF UNRELIABILITY. 
The State puts the cart before the horse in arguing that 
"any discrepancies between the witnesses individual descriptions of 
defendant's appearance and/or between defendant's appearance at the 
time of his arrest, do not render the identifications inadmissible, 
but do bear on the individual eyewitness's credibility and weight 
the jurors may give the identification testimony." State's br. at 
19. The State makes the same mistake concerning identification 
here as that made by the trial court concerning the lawfulness of 
the stop in Ramirez. The trial court serves a critical gatekeeping 
function in precluding the admission of illegally seized and 
unreliable evidence. Reliability is a threshold matter to be 
determined in the first instance by the trial court. The jury is 
only entitled to hear and assess the weight of the identification 
perpetrator, to the perpetrator who was behind Brandi, to the 
perpetrator who confronted Rick and Donny; the coercive effect of 
identification of the getaway car in leading the eyewitnesses to 
expect that the perpetrators had been apprehended and were in the 
showup; and the selective handcuffing that naturally made Mr. Lopez 
and Mr. Gomez appear to be the guilty parties. 
5 
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evidence if it is first determined by the trial court to be 
sufficiently reliable to warrant admission. Discrepancies in the 
descriptions given by the eyewitnesses must be considered in 
conjunction with all the other factors in assessing reliability. 
The discrepancies here were significant. Mr. Lopez was 
5'4", weighing 180 or 185 pounds. R. 246:155, 230:189, Ex. 12. 
The eyewitnesses described the perpetrator identified at trial as 
Mr. Lopez as 5'5M and 165 pounds (Rick, Ex. 33), 5'5M and 145 
pounds (Brandi, Ex. 31), and similar to 5'7" and 150 pounds (Donny, 
Ex. 32) . Each eyewitness desciribes someone somewhat taller and 
fairly significantly lighter than Mr. Lopez. 
The State's reliance in its brief at p. 19 on State v. 
Perry, 899 P. 2d 1232, 1234-5 (Utah App. 1995) is wholly misplaced. 
In Perry, the witness described the perpetrator as 5'6" to 5'7" and 
150 pounds. Mr. Perry was 5'9" tall and 170 pounds. The 
discrepancy there indicates only that the victim underestimated the 
perpetrator's size. The description given describes a person with 
a similar build to the person apprehended. Perry would be apropos 
here if the perpetrator had been described as 5'2" and 16 0 pounds, 
or 5'6" and 205 pounds. Here, Mr. Lopez is uniformly shorter and 
heavier than the person described by the eyewitnesses. While they 
described someone slightly stocky, Mr. Lopez in contrast was 
downright heavy if not obese. See Ex. 11, 26. The descriptions 
simply do not match Mr. Lopez. The identification is unreliable. 
The State similarly minimizes the fact that the witnesses 
were entirely inconsistent as to what part the perpetrator they 
6 
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identified as Mr. Lopez may have played in the robbery. Rather 
than being "relatively insignificant," State's br. at 22, this 
inconsistency draws into question the memory acquisition, 
retention, and recall abilities of each of the witnesses. Their 
inability to keep their stories straight draws into question the 
veracity and reliability of those stories. 
Mr. Lopez agrees with the State that the witnesses 
consistently described the perpetrator's height and weight, but 
this consistency does not Mlend[] weight to the accuracy of their 
individual observations," State's br. at 24. They consistently 
describe someone taller and lighter, hence thinner, than Mr. Lopez. 
They described the actual perpetrator, who was not Mr. Lopez. 
POINT III. THE STATE IMPROPERLY IGNORES THE TAINT 
OF THE IMPROPERLY SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP ON LATER 
PROCEEDINGS. 
The State improperly characterizes the photo spread 
identifications as being independently obtained, State's br. at 21, 
without taking into consideration the fact that the initial showup 
was not independent, but rather a tainted collaborative effort. 
This taint carries over to all subsequent identifications, and 
renders them equally unreliable. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE EQUATED 
WITH A RULING THAT THE IDENTIFICATIONS WERE 
SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO GO TO THE JURY. 
The State correctly notes that the trial court ruled that 
the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, State's br. at 28, 
7 
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but this ruling may not be equated with a finding of reliability. 
A ruling on sufficiency necessarily assumes that the evidence 
presented was properly admissible. The trial court's finding of 
sufficiency assumes, without deciding, the reliability of the 
identifications. As a result of trial counsel's deficient 
performance, the trial court never had occasion to address that 
issue. 
Mr. Lopez relies on his opening brief in response to 
those portions of the State's brief not expressly addressed here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Lopez respectfully requests 
that his conviction be reversed, and that the case be remanded for 
further proceedings. ^Ji^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this P day of April, 1999. 
l//d-r v VK ? ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
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The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
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Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person, be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that examination 
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable 
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
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